

Money and Marriage: A Fresh Look at Marriage Transaction in Rural India (preliminary)

1. Introduction

In most societies, the formation of marital union involves financial transaction of some form. The net transaction from the bride's family to that of groom's at marriage, is the most common practice surrounding marriage transaction in most parts of India. Dowry plays a very important role in a woman's life in India as it shapes the destiny of her life. This is because in India dowry acts like a groom-price, the higher the amount of dowry the girl's family can pay, the better groom she will be able to get in terms of groom's income, social status, education, family asset and the like. Moreover, the higher the amount of dowry a bride brings into a family, the better position she holds regarding autonomy and ability to participate in the decision making process in husband's extended household where she generally moves after marriage. Though groomprice is the more practiced custom, brideprice is not uncommon either. Both groomprice and brideprice can be practiced simultaneously at the formation of marital union.

Because of its significance in the process of union formation and lives of women in India and other parts of the world, it is important to understand the practice of dowry and the characteristics of bride and groom that determine the amount paid as dowry. A good amount of research has been done in this area. But all the work that I know of has treated dowry either as a one-sided transaction or a net transaction from bride's family to that of the groom. Dowry viewed as a unidirectional flow of cash or kind from bride's family to the groom ignores the fact that brideprice can be paid at the same time. Thus, these studies overestimate the amount of dowry paid. Again, the problem of viewing dowry as a net outcome is that it ignores the level of transaction and considers people who were not involved in any exchange in the same group with people who exchanged in equal amount of cash or kind no matter how large is the amount. This paper analyzes both direction of marriage transactions – groomprice and brideprice. Groomprice is the amount paid by the bride's family to the groom's family; and brideprice, the amount paid by the groom's family either to the bride or her family at marriage. By decomposing dowry into its two

components to determine the desirable qualities of brides and grooms in the marriage market of rural India this paper fills out the gap.

There could be two main reasons for a bride's family to pay groomprice. Firstly, groomprice could be voluntary – to attract better quality groom for the daughter or to provide bequest to the daughter so that she can enjoy a better status in the house of her in-laws, where she moves after her marriage. If the groomprice actually serves as bequest to the daughter, then groom's characteristics such as age, education or landholding should not matter in determining the groomprice. But the groom's characteristics would play a vital role if groomprice is paid to attract better quality groom. Secondly, bride's family may pay groomprice as it is demanded from the groom's family as a condition of the marriage. In this case, both the bride's and the groom's attributes are likely to have significant importance in determining the value of groomprice. If the groom possesses better qualities, his family will demand more as groomprice. Therefore, groomprice will increase with his level of education and parental landholding and will be lower for older grooms. Similarly, groomprice will also vary by the quality of the bride. Since we do not have information about whether the groomprice was demanded or not at the time of marriage, it is difficult to distinguish these two types of groomprice. Nevertheless, finding significance of the bride's quality in determining the value of groomprice indicates that the groomprice is more likely to be demanded than to be voluntary. This is because there is no reason to believe that parents discriminate in paying groomprice based on their daughter's marriageable qualities. Again, we can think of the same two reasons for the groom's family to pay brideprice. Firstly, brideprice can be paid voluntarily to attract better quality bride or as a symbol of status. Providing bequest is not applicable in this case since it is against the culture for the groom to move to live with his in-laws after the marriage. If brideprice is paid to attract better quality bride then we will find significant effect of bridal quality in determining the value of brideprice. If brideprice is paid as a symbol of status, we may not find any significant variation by either bride or groom's quality on the value of brideprice. Secondly, brideprice could be demanded by the bride's family. But this is less likely to be the case as sons are valued

more in the Indian traditional society and grooms' families always have the upper hand in marriage negotiation especially among Hindus in rural areas.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, data and method used in this paper has been discussed in section 2. Results are presented in section 3 divided into two sub-sections – 3.a the determinants of groomprice and 3.b the determinants of brideprice. Finally, I finish the paper with a conclusion.

2. Data and Method

Data from the second round of Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) 1998-99 is used for the analysis. REDS is a panel data representative of rural households across India covering the period of 1982 through 1999. The survey was conducted by the National Council of Applied Economic Research, NCAER. The baseline survey was conducted in 1981-82 in 259 villages located in major 16 states except Assam. The survey, which was designed to be representative of rural households of those states, covered 4979 households. The second round of the survey was carried out in 1998-99 where all households in the 1982 survey with at least one member of the household remained in the village (except the residents of Jammu and Kashmir) were resurveyed. The REDS data contain detailed information on asset ownership, income, financial transaction, marriage exchange, farm management, and time allocation. The Indian census data of the years 1981, 1991 and 2001 are used for community level information such as sex ratio of marriageable men and women.

The sample for the main regression model includes 2,154 Hindu marriages that were conducted within the time period 1975 to 1999. The marriage and dowry information was collected retrospectively. Retrospective data always have potential to be affected by recall bias. But as Deolalikar and Rao (1990) mentioned, in India marriage is one of the most important event in a person's life especially for women. Moreover, marriage transaction represents a very large proportion of household income and asset, and is a factor that plays a very significant role in marriage decision-making. So, it is less likely

to be subject to recall bias and this is especially true for marriage exchange. But still to reduce long-term recall bias, I include only those marriages in the sample, which were conducted after the year 1975. Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the sample population.

There are some characteristics of the bride and groom that are more desirable in the marriage market. In general, if the groom is associated with those desirable characteristics, the bride's family will be willing to pay more in order to marry off their daughter to that groom. Similarly, if the bride is more desirable in the marriage market then the bride's family may not need to pay a higher amount of dowry to marry off their daughter. Thus, there are important characteristics or qualities of the bride and the groom that plays crucial role in determining the amount of marriage transaction that is paid either in cash or kind from one family to the other. To determine those characteristics, that are important in assessing the amount of marriage transaction from one family to the other, Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression model has been utilized.

It is reasonable to believe that the amount paid by the groom's family, which I refer as 'brideprice' is not independent of the amount paid by the bride's family. The amount paid by the bride's family is referred as 'groomprice'. The reason for using Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression model is that it acknowledges the correlation between the errors associated with dependent variables of both brideprice and groomprice.

3. Results

The result of the regression model is presented in table 2. As expected the error terms of the two regression models with outcome variables brideprice and groomprice are significantly correlated at 0.2154 level of correlation. This suggests that the regressions are not totally independent of each other, meaning the factors affecting the amount of groomprice also affect the amount of brideprice.

3.a Determinants of groomprice

3.a.i Characteristics of bride and groom: The parents of older brides pay a higher amount of groomprice. The value of groomprice increases by 1,292 rupees for each year increase in bride's age. One surprising but not unusual result is that bride's level of education has a positive relation with the amount paid by the bride's family. For increase in each year of schooling, the value of groomprice increases by 4,601 rupees. Other studies have also found similar result¹. Unlike the positive relation between bride's age and groomprice, increase in groom's age negatively affects groomprice, that is, bride's parent pay less if the groom is older. Groomprice reduces by 784 rupees for one additional year of groom's age. Grooms level of education positively inflates groomprice. For one additional year of schooling groomprice rises by 1,233 rupees. To further analyze the effects of bride's and groom's level of education on groomprice, additional OLS regressions have been run (table 4, 5).

To assess the effect of bride's level of education, I have divided the brides into two groups by their education status. The mean value of groomprice for the educated brides (55,027 rupees) is almost three fold of the groomprice of the uneducated brides (18,792 rupees) (Table 3). This clearly indicates that these two groups might be very distinct and face different marriage market choices.

The estimates of the OLS regression model is presented in table 4; model A includes only the uneducated brides and model B includes only the brides who have at least 2 years of schooling. The results show that for these two groups of women, underlying mechanisms to determine the value of groomprice are different. For the educated group (model B), each year of schooling of the bride significantly increases the level of groomprice. After controlling for other individual, household and community level variables, I found that for each year increase on schooling, the groomprice increases by 6,732 rupees. The level of education is the only bridal characteristic that matters in determining the groomprice for those educated brides. Neither the bride or the groom's age or even the groom's level

¹ For example, see Dasgupta and Mukherjee 2003.

of education does not have any significant effect. This indicates that for educated brides, groomprice could be a bequest from their parents. Parents who are likely to provide bequest for their daughters are also more likely to educate their daughters. Again, bride's education could be an imperfect proxy of wealth, which is not completely captured by landholding. In that case, we can say that wealthier parents are more likely to provide groomprice as bequest. Unlike the educated brides, for the uneducated group (model A), bride's age significantly increases groomprice. Groomprice is negatively related with groom's age but the relation is positive with groom's education, suggesting uneducated bride's parents pay less if the groom is older but they pay more for educated grooms. Thus, for uneducated brides, groomprice is less likely to be bequest, rather it is paid either to attract better quality groom or because groomprice is demanded by the groom's family as a condition of marriage.

To unfold how groom's education might affect groomprice, I have also divided the grooms into two groups based on their education status. Table 3 presents the mean and median groomprice for these two different groups as well as for all marriages. Like educated brides, educated grooms are also associated with about three times of the groomprice compared to their uneducated counterpart displaying clear distinction between these two groups. I ran separate OLS regressions to identify which characteristics of bride and groom are associated with higher groomprice for these two different sets of grooms. The results of the regressions are shown in table 5. Model A corresponds with uneducated grooms and model B includes only the educated grooms.

For the educated grooms, both the bride's and groom's attributes play significant role in determining the value of groomprice. Groomprice increases both with bride's age and level of education. For each additional year of age and schooling of the bride, the groomprice increases by 1,368 and 4,577 rupees respectively. For educated grooms, groomprice is also determined by their age and level of education. Groomprice increases with groom's years of education but declines with age. For an additional year of schooling the amount paid by the bride's family increases by 1,235 rupees and an additional year of age reduces the groomprice by 859 rupees. Unlike their educated

counterpart, for uneducated grooms none of the individual characteristics of the bride or the groom has any significant effect on the determination of groomprice. Thus, for this group, groomprice does not significantly vary by personal attributes of its agents. These findings indicate the existence of multiple marriage markets and interesting implication of groomprice and its nature.

Bride's parents pay more groomprice either to attract educated, young grooms, whom I am referring as 'high quality grooms' or they pay more for educated grooms because the high quality grooms have higher bargaining power to demand more groomprice. As there is a positive association between bride and groom's level of education² and groomprice increases with bride's education level, high groomprice can be paid as a result of both providing bequest and a method to attract better quality groom or meeting the demand of the groom's family.

3.a.ii Household and matching characteristics: The household variables that are included in the regression model are landholding of bride's parents at the time of marriage, landholding of groom's parents at the time of marriage, number of sisters the bride has, distance of marriage migration, caste affiliation, and year of marriage.

Interestingly, the result of the regression model (Table 2) shows insensitive and insignificant relation between groomprice and parental landholding of the bride at the time of marriage suggesting groomprice is not a wealth affect from the bride's side of the family in contrast to the argument made by Edlund, 1997. Whether the bride's parents are landless or possess a large amount of land does not have any impact on the amount of groomprice they pay to the groom or his family. Given these findings, it can be argued that in general, groomprice is not a bequest from the bride's parental point of view. This leaves us with two options – either groomprice is demanded by groom's family or it was paid to attract better quality groom. I found positive association of groomprice with groom's parental landholding although the magnitude is not very high. The significance of groom's parental landholding is consistent with the above mentioned two possible

² See Table 6 for bride and groom's positive association by education status

scenarios: first, either groomprice is demanded as grooms with land might have higher bargaining power in marriage negotiation process; and second grooms with land are considered as better quality grooms compared to the landless ones and thus brides' parents are willing to pay more groomprice to attract these grooms. To investigate the effect of groom's parental landholding in detail, I ran a couple more OLS regressions (Table 8); one with grooms from landless families (model A) and the other including grooms from families with landholding (model B). The value of average and median groomprice for the landless and land owned grooms are presented in table 7.

Considering grooms with land, results from the regression (table 4.7, model B) show significant effect of the attributes of bride and groom in determining the value of groomprice that the bride's family pays. Bride's age at marriage, years of schooling and groom's years of schooling have positive effect on groomprice. Not surprisingly, increase in groom's age at marriage reduces the value of groomprice. Each additional acre of land raises the value of groomprice by 5 rupees. If we consider the magnitude of the effect, it is not much rather the difference in groomprice is more dichotomous by status of landholding. For landless grooms, groomprice does not vary by individual attributes of the bride and groom except for the bride's level of education. Each year of schooling of the bride increases the groomprice by about 4,505 rupees. Thus it is safe to argue that grooms with landholding are considered as high quality grooms and bride's family pay more either because of their intention to get a better groom or to meet the demand of groom's family. But this is not the case with landless grooms; as a result, the average groomprice is lower for them.

It is argued in the literature that the number of sisters the bride has reduces the amount of groomprice that the bride's parents are willing to pay. This could be either because of cash constraint or parents desire to pay equal amount of groomprice for each daughter (Botticini, 1999, Dalmia, 2004). The statistical insignificance of the coefficient of the variable 'number of sisters the bride has' suggests that this variable does not have any significant affect on the amount of groomprice. This could indicate that the groomprice is paid as it is demanded from the groom's family who does not have any incentive to

discriminate the brides by their number of sisters rather than being voluntary from bride's parents. Though insignificant, the consistent negative relation between groomprice and bride's number of sisters in all the regression models including the main and sub models, by bride's education status, and by groom's education or landholding status reveal that the larger the number of sisters the bride has, the lower the groomprice is. Hence, even though groomprice is demanded there could be elements of bride's parents' desire to pay groomprice voluntarily for better future of their daughter.

The result shows significant positive effect of distance of marriage migration on amount of groomprice. This provides support for Rosenzweig and Starks' (1989) argument about marriage migration and income diversification of the family. They argue that to marry off the daughter to a groom at a distant area, parents are willing to pay more to avail the opportunity to diversify their income risks through informal credit provided by their in-laws living, in distant areas characterized by different income risks. If we think about the demand side, it also could be that the grooms from distant areas demand more groomprice to compensate the risk of having less information about the bride. The relation between distance of marriage migration and groomprice varies by the groom's educational and landholding attributes, making it more interesting. Unlike the uneducated grooms, for the educated ones, the distance does not increase the groomprice. This exactly follows Rosenzweig and Stark argument as educated grooms are already in a different income risk group who are not likely to be involved in farming and thus bride's parents do not need to look for grooms from a distant place for income risk diversification. Again, considering landholding, for grooms with parental landholding, distance of marriage migration increases groomprice, but that is not the case with landless grooms. Rather, for landless groom, distance reduces groomprice though the relation is not statistically significant. It reveals that bride's parents prefer to marry off their daughter far only if that helps them to diversify income risk and that is possible if the groom has access to land. For landless grooms, groomprice is more likely to decline with distance.

In India, the society is stratified by caste system and caste is positively related with the socio-economic position of a household. High caste dummy is included along with landholdings of both bride and groom's fathers to capture any additional effect of caste other than its wealth effect. Even though the magnitude of the coefficient is positive and big, it is not statistically significant, suggesting once controlling for other variables, caste does not have any significant effect on groomprice.

The most consistent but somewhat surprising finding is that the real value of groomprice is declining with time, which goes against a large body of literature arguing about the inflation of dowry in the Indian marriage market (Rao 1993a; Anderson, 2003; Edlund, 2001; Billig, 1992; Upadhya 1990; Deolalikar and Rao 1990; Paul, 1985; Srinivas 1984; Lindenbaum, 1981; Epstein 1973)³. The real value of groomprice has declined irrespective of both bride and groom's educational status and groom's father's landholding.

3.a.iii Community level effect:

One of the major explanation provided in the demographic literature to explain the existence of dowry is the excess supply of marriageable women than men in the marriage market which is generally referred to by the term 'marriage squeeze' (Caldwell at. el. 1983; Rao 1993a, 1993b; Bhat and Halli 1999; Billig 1992). The result of the analysis provides strong support for marriage squeeze argument. I found that groomprice is significantly higher if there are more women at marriageable age in a district than the number of marriageable men in the same district.

There exists a large and significant regional variation in amount of groomprice that is paid at marriage. The average amount of groomprice is 60,000 rupees higher in Western region compared to the average amount paid in Southern and Eastern region after controlling for the individual, household and community level characteristics. However,

³ For articles arguing for decline in real dowry, see Dalmia, 2004. The difference between dowry and groomprice is that dowry is the groomprice net of brideprice. It is still possible for dowry to inflate despite the decline of groomprice only if brideprice declines at a much higher rate than groomprice.

in North India, it is about 18,000 rupees less than the average groomprice of Southern and Eastern region.

Some studies have argued that there are cultural differences between North and South for which the dowry practice is different in these two regions. However, The above results do not provide any evidence against the North –South dichotomy in the amount of dowry paid or the prevalence rate of the practice with respect to marriage transaction. Rather this difference is more likely to be originated from wealth variation by regions⁴. It could be that the practice is more prevalent in the North, but due to variation in regional income and within region inequality, the prevalence dichotomy is not reflected in the amount of groomprice that is paid. Table 10 displays the mean and median amount of groomprice by region. In West, the mean and median groomprice is the largest as well as the mean and median income per capita. On the contrary, North displays the lowest mean and median groom price as well as the lowest median income per capita. Larger gap between mean and median income per capita in the North reflects its high within region income inequality. All these, suggest that one of the main reason of regional variation in groomprice is inter region wealth variation. In all four regions, average groomprice is much higher (more than double) than the median amount, suggesting small number of households pay really high amount of groomprice, thus driving the average upward. Similar result was found by Dalmia, 2004.

3.b Determinants of brideprice

3.b.i Characteristics of bride and groom: The only individual characteristic that has any significant effect on the amount paid as brideprice is bride's age at marriage. Brideprice is positively associated with bride's age at marriage, meaning groom's family pays a higher brideprice if the bride is older. In this sample of rural Indian marriage unions, the mean age at marriage for women is 18 years. By age 32, 99% of all women get married. There is no significant effect of either bride's education or parental landholding or even groom's education on brideprice. Groom's parental landholding has negative affect,

⁴ For region-wise mean and median income per capita, see table 9.

suggesting groom's with more parental landholding pays less brideprice. But this affect is marginally significant and the magnitude is very small.

3.b.ii *Household and matching characteristics*: The number of sisters that the groom has has highly significant positive effect on brideprice. It is difficult to explain this relation even though the relation is persistent. Distance of marriage migration is not a significant variable that affects brideprice. Though caste is not significant either, interestingly it shows a negative relation. High caste groom pays less brideprice may be because they enjoy higher bargaining power obtained from their caste affiliation. Like groomprice, the real value of brideprice is also declining over time and the relation is statistically significant.

3.b.iii *Community level effect*: According to the marriage squeeze hypothesis, with high sex ratio of marriageable women and men (F/M), it is the groomprice or dowry that is expected to be affected positively not brideprice. And as expected, the result does not display any significant effect of sex ratio on the amount paid as brideprice. But like groomprice, we see significant regional variation in case of brideprice too. Table 10 presents the mean and median value of brideprice for four different regions.

Universally, the median brideprice is zero for all India as well as for all four regions. Thus, it can be strongly asserted that brideprice is not a general practice in rural India. It is practiced by a very few households. The mean brideprice is also very low compared to groomprice. In the South, it is less than one-sixth of the average groomprice and in other regions it is at least one-eighth of the corresponding groomprices. This goes against the argument that brideprice is a common practice in the South. Though in the South, brideprice is more practiced compared to other regions, it is definitely not the dominant practice of marriage transaction.

4. Conclusion

This paper analyzes dowry taking into account the financial transaction from both sides involved in the formation of a marital union. By doing that, it tries to demystify the characteristics of bride and groom that are more valued in the marriage market by the other side. Thus, this paper provides a more comprehensive picture of the determinants of dowry and fills up some of the gaps that exist in the literature. Groomprice is much higher for educated brides and it increases with years of schooling. For uneducated brides, bride's age and groom's quality significantly affect the amount paid which is not the case with an educated bride. However, for educated grooms both bride's and groom's age and education play significant role in determining the value of groomprice. But for uneducated or landless grooms, none of the individual characteristics of either the bride or groom matters.

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Table 1. Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation
Groom's family paid brideprice	0.19	0.39
Bride's family paid groomprice	0.89	0.31
Amount paid by groom's family, if paid (constant 1999 rupees)	28625.63	56344.94
Amount paid by bride's family, if paid (constant 1999 rupees)	38945.57	70295.48
Groom's age at marriage	23.61	6.25
Bride's age at marriage	18.1	4.48
Groom is literate	0.71	0.46
Bride is literate	0.46	0.50
Groom's schooling, if literate (year)	6.62	3.19
Bride's schooling, if literate (year)	5.61	2.65
Groom's father owns land	0.76	0.43
Bride's father owns land	0.70	0.46
Groom's father's landholding at the time of marriage (acre)	934.57	1208.16
Bride's father's landholding at the time of marriage (acre)	773.70	1063.58
Year of marriage	1984.54	6.14
Distance of marriage migration (km)	29.58	62.77
High caste	0.34	
Middle caste	0.22	
Low caste	0.44	
Region: East	0.11	
West	0.14	
North	0.42	
South	0.29	
N	2154	

Table 2. Estimates of the Determinants of Marriage Transaction (Zellner's SUR Model)

Variables	Co-eff	Std. Err.
Amount Paid by Bride's Family (Groomprice)		
Intercept	2430432	454494.9***
Matching bride & groom characteristics		
Bride's age at marriage	1292.483	447.5323**
Groom's age at marriage	-784.4532	340.2301*
Bride's year of schoolong	4601.69	623.0918***
Groom's year of schooling	1233.037	455.953**
Matching household characteristics		
Bride's parental landholding at marriage	0.5954229	1.668388
Groom's parental landholding at marriage	5.606326	1.369541***
Bride's number of sisters	-1171.176	922.7494
Distance of marriage migration	41.22418	18.15453*
High caste	4251.404	2831.251
Year of marriage	-1259.255	227.9271***
Community level variables		
District marriageable sex ratio (F/M)	751.9925	119.4357***
Region: West	14460.12	2532.301***
North	-18064.56	3411.867***
Amount Paid by Groom's Family (Brideprice)		
Intercept	493009.5	186957.8**
Matching bride & groom characteristics		
Bride's age at marriage	279.5388	124.5748*
Bride's year of schoolong	281.1567	255.9722
Groom's year of schooling	29.03158	187.4381
Matching household characteristics		
Bride's parental landholding at marriage	0.0853315	0.6837839
Groom's parental landholding at marriage	-1.017899	0.5613497
Groom's number of sisters	1424.591	346.9152***
Distance of marriage migration	3.311276	7.452305
High caste	-854.1352	1164.143
Year of marriage	-251.7558	93.77468**
Community level variables		
District marriageable sex ratio (F/M)	38.54448	49.03207
Region: West	14460.12	2532.301***
North	-2367.913	1320.841
Total	2154	
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: $\chi^2(1) = 99.914$, Pr = 0.0000		
Correlation matrix of residuals:		
	Brideprice	Groomprice
Brideprice	1	
Groomprice	0.2154	1

*** p<.0001, ** p<.01, *<.05, + p<.06

Table 3. Mean and median groomprice by the education level of the bride and the groom

	N	Mean groomprice (S.E.)	Median groomprice
All	2154	35,193.52 (1,467.52)	12,254.61
Educated bride	975	55,026.74 (2,769.20)	26,780.93
Uneducated bride	1179	18,792.00 (1,201.35)	7,002.801
Diff		36,234.74 (2,843.65)***	
Educated groom	1558	42,902.32 (1,952.15)	16,068.56
Uneducated groom	596	15,041.98 (1,073.22)	6,896.642
Diff		27,860.33 (3,225.70)***	

*Note: All mean and median groomprices are in Rupees, *** $p > |t| = 0.000$*

Table 4. OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Groomprice by Bride's Education Status

Variables	Model A (Uneducated brides)		Model B (Educated brides)	
	Co-eff	Std. Err.	Co-eff	Std. Err.
Intercept	1363163**	399678.6	3515591***	863558.2
<i>Matching bride & groom characteristics</i>				
Bride's age at marriage	961.478	369.382	1182.998	952.6444
Groom's age at marriage	-586.927	291.039*	-893.6386	699.7991
Bride's year of schooling			6732.275***	1258.549
Groom's year of schooling	1561.482***	386.879	747.5257	906.8653
<i>Matching household characteristics</i>				
Bride's parental landholding at marriage	-105334	1.511	1.539942	3.22093
Groom's parental landholding at marriage	10.019***	1.592	4.063249+	2.143489
Bride's number of sisters	-853.335	782.176	-2412.739	1920.422
Distance of marriage migration	27.109	15.509	61.93783	35.23518
High caste	1037.781	2527.11	7815.586	5316.38
Year of marriage	-689.314	200.288**	-1838.684	433.495***
<i>Community level variables</i>				
District marriageable sex ratio (F/M)	199.501+	107.999	1310.742***	219.4732
Region: West	58192.43***	7558.722	60600.22***	10511.26
North	-18803.28	2945.478***	-19210.22	6736.909**
N	1179		975	
R ²	0.179		0.195	

*** $p < .0001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .06$

Table 5. OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Groomprice by Groom's Education Status

Variables	Model A (Uneducated grooms)		Model B (Educated grooms)	
	Co-eff	Std. Err.	Co-eff	Std. Err.
Intercept	1646899	362092.1***	2750107	610890***
<i>Matching bride & groom characteristics</i>				
Bride's age at marriage	654.529	371.757	1367.872*	603.27
Groom's age at marriage	-339.486	269.011	-859.46	474.325+
Bride's year of schooling	1616.253	1202.677	4576.716***	747.131
Groom's year of schooling			1234.936	666.958+
<i>Matching household characteristics</i>				
Bride's parental landholding at marriage	1.354	2.223	0.341	2.04
Groom's parental landholding at marriage	3.501	1.997	5.739**	1.647
Bride's number of sisters	-828.014	762.882	-1773.136	1264.322
Distance of marriage migration	32.443**	10.012	52.813	31.562
High caste	1181.509	2482.04	4552.821	3698.8
Year of marriage	-823.225	181.251***	-1429.125	306.568***
<i>Community level variables</i>				
District marriageable sex ratio (F/M)	34.445	103.905	925.363***	156.814
Region: West	10904.66	7229.341	64884.7***	7911.165
North	-16659.96	2542.288***	-18430.1	4752.375***

N

R²

1558

0.2143

*** $p < .0001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .07$

Table 6. Assortative Matching of Bride and Groom by Education

Bride/Groom	0 yrs of schooling	2 or more yrs of schooling	Total
0 yrs of schooling	793	804	1597
	49.66	50.34	100
	93.08	38.58	54.39
2 or more yrs of schooling	59	1280	1339
	4.41	95.59	100
	6.92	61.42	46
	852	2084	2936
Total	29.02	70.98	100
	100	100	100

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 723.9833$ Pr = 0.000

Table 7. Mean and median groomprice by landholding status of groom's parents

	N	Mean groomprice (S.E)	Median groomprice
All	2154	35,193.52 (1,467.52)	12,254.61
Grooms with parental landholding	1648	38,643.81 (1,812.19)	14,020.35
Grooms with landless parents	506	23,956.20 (1,968.69)	10,080.34
Diff		14,687.60 (3447.89)***	

*Note: All mean and median groomprices are in Rupees, *** $p > |t| = 0.000$*

Table 8. OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Groomprice by Groom's Parental Landholding Status

Variables	Model A (Landless grooms)		Model B (Grooms with land)	
	Co-eff	Std. Err.	Co-eff	Std. Err.
Intercept			2780024***	560164.4
<i>Matching bride & groom characteristics</i>				
Bride's age at marriage	790.349	708.231	1318.832*	546.819
Groom's age at marriage	835.763	590.598	-1052.847	413.692*
Bride's year of schooling	4504.92***	980.908	4597.941***	751.717
Groom's year of schooling	868.69	715.42	1150.66*	547.894
<i>Matching household characteristics</i>				
Bride's parental landholding at marriage	-0.411	5.55	0.112	1.862
Groom's parental landholding at marriage	-803.963	1481.932	5.219**	1.54
Bride's number of sisters	-11.668	36.827	-1399.581	1130.958
Distance of marriage migration	-561.224	4457.449	45.818*	20.773
High caste	-726.49	326.168*	4754.301	3422.419
Year of marriage			-1433.21	281.110***
<i>Community level variables</i>				
District marriageable sex ratio (F/M)	487.148*	193.267	802.991***	142.188
Region: West	22696.05*	9923.054	66421.26***	7543.088
North	-931.056	4711.79	-22899.36	4286.32***
N	506		1648	
R ²	0.1597		0.2433	

*** $p < .0001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .07$

Table 9. Mean and Median Income per Capita (year 1984-85) by Region

Region	State	Per Capita Income*(Rp)	Mean	Median
East	Orissa	1,707	2,207.67	2,438
	West Bengal	2,478		
	Assam	2,433		
West	Gujarat	3,204	3,289.50	3,289.50
	Maharashtra	3,375		
North	Bihar	1,504	2,385	1,849
	Haryana	3,365		
	Himachal Pradesh	2,249		
	Madhya Pradesh	1,821		
	Punjab	4,123		
	Rajasthan	1,849		
	Uttar Pradesh	1,784		
South	Andhra Pradesh	2,086	2,288.75	2,318.50
	Karnataka	2,432		
	Kerala	2,296		
	Tamil Nadu	2,341		

* Incomes are in 1993-94 value

Source: Statistical Abstract 1974-1993, Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Govt. of Delhi

Table 10 Mean and median groomprice by region

Region	N	Mean groomprice (S.E.)	Median groomprice
All	2154	35,193.52 (1,467.52)	12,254.61
East	330	32,830.03 (3,451.07)	10,634.62
West	126	111,669.70 (13141.86)***	69,966.82
North	1178	18,887.81 (998.94)***	6,367.399
South	520	55,101.36 (3514.08)***	28,719.13

Note: All mean and median groomprices are in Rupees,

*** $p > |t| = 0.000 =$; i.e. the mean is significantly different from the mean of rest of the regions

Table 11 Mean and median brideprice by region

Region	N	Mean brideprice (S.E.)	Median brideprice
All	2154	4,941.672 (539.67)	0
East	330	131.9185 (96.66)***	0
West	126	18,853.5 (5,242.51)***	0
North	1178	2,624.29 (632.18)***	0
South	520	9,872.834 (1,074.60)***	0

Note: All mean and median brideprices are in Rupees,

**** $p > |t| = 0.000$; i.e. the mean is significantly different from the mean of rest of the regions*